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[1]  At the point where one of the most venerable principles of common 
law and the reality of modern information management collide, even the 
most diligent attorneys may become victims of the resulting fallout.  The 
attorney-client privilege2 is a bedrock principle of the common law, 
                                                 
1 Dennis R. Kiker is a partner in the Richmond, Virginia firm of Moran Kiker Brown PC.  
Mr. Kiker graduated magna cum laude and Order of the Coif from the University of 
Michigan Law School in 1994, and is licensed to practice law in Arizona and Virginia.  
His practice involves commercial and product liability litigation, with an emphasis on 
litigation preparedness, electronic discovery, and trial practice.  He would like to thank 
Denis Riva, University of Richmond School of Law, Class of 2006, for his invaluable 
research assistance. 
2 The attorney-client privilege attaches to a communication only if: 
 
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; 
(2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member 
of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this 
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a 
fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the 
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serving several important purposes.  The privilege ensures that a client 
seeking legal advice will be able to fully disclose the facts of her situation 
to her attorney without fear of her confidences being used to her 
disadvantage.3  Similarly, the client’s confidence in the confidentiality of 
her communications ensures that her attorney will be equipped with all the 
pertinent facts necessary to enable zealous representation and an effective 
search for the truth.4  Yet the attorney’s responsibility to protect and 
preserve that privilege is at great risk when confronted with the flood of 
information contained on even small computer networks.  As the volume 
of information subject to discovery increases, the burden of reviewing that 
information to segregate privileged communications also increases.  
Unfortunately, absent a stipulation by the parties or court order to the 
contrary, the timeframe within which to complete discovery remains 
limited.  At some point, as a result of limited time and resources, or the 
                                                                                                                         
presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) 
an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal 
proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; 
and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the 
client. 
 
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 
1950).  This article is concerned with the very last element: waiver; specifically, 
in the context of inadvertent disclosure in the course of discovery.  In addition, I 
will discuss waiver principles in connection with attorney-client privileged 
information only.  This is done with recognition that there are many other types 
of privilege, such as the executive privilege, doctor-patient privilege, trade 
secret privilege, etc., and that each may have its unique jurisprudence.  See, e.g., 
Roberta M. Harding, Waiver: A Comprehensive Analysis of a Consequence of 
Inadvertently Producing Documents Protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege, 
42 CATH. U. L. REV. 465, 482 n.84 (identifying various statutory privileges, 
including the marital privilege, physician-patient privilege, priest-penitent 
privilege and counselor-client privilege).  However, “the privilege at issue 
appears not to affect whether inadvertent disclosure constitutes a waiver.”  John 
T. Hundley, Annotation, Waiver of Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent 
Disclosure – Federal Law, 159 A.L.R. FED. 153. § 2a (2005). See also 
Transamerica Computer Co. v. Int’l Bus. Mach., 573 F.2d 646, 648 n.1 
(distinguishing between the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine 
“is unimportant . . . where the third person to whom the disclosure was made . . . 
was [an] adversary in litigation”).   
3 Jennifer A. Hardgrove, Note, Scope of Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege: Articulating 
a Standard That Will Afford Guidance to Courts, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998). 
4 Id. 
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sheer volume alone, privileged information will be disclosed 
inadvertently.5 
 
[2]  The currently pending proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure recognize this risk and incorporate procedural protections 
for what many are increasingly recognizing as the inevitable inadvertent 
disclosure of privileged information.6  However, in many jurisdictions this 
protection is ephemeral. The applicable substantive law, narrowly 
circumscribing the privilege in favor of the search for truth that is the 
purpose of our legal system, does not recognize an inadvertent disclosure 
exception to the traditional principle that disclosure of privileged 
information to a third party waives the privilege.7  In this article, I will 
explore briefly the attorney-client privilege and the law regarding waiver 
of that privilege, and examine the risks those principles create for lawyers 
working in a world where even a routine production of documents in 
response to discovery may capture hundreds of thousands, or even 
millions, of individual communications.  I will also examine the 
procedural and ethical rules that attempt to address the problem, and 
identify the shortcomings of each.  Finally, I will recommend a uniform 
treatment of inadvertent waiver issues, as well as a complementary 
modification to the rules of ethics. 
 
II. INFORMATION OVERLOAD 
 
[3]  Just how much information is out there?  Researchers at the School for 
Information Management and Systems of the University of California at 
                                                 
5 “Inadvertent,” by definition, means “unintentional.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 586 (10th ed. 1999).  This article is concerned with the purely 
inadvertent disclosure, rather than “an intentional or purposeful disclosure.”  (Int’l 
Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 446 (D. Mass. 1988)).  Some 
courts, however, view any disclosure, inadvertent or not, as voluntary.   
6 SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Agenda E-18 (hereinafter Judicial Conference Report), at 27 
(Sept. 2005),  http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf (“The problems that 
can result from efforts to guard against privilege waiver often become more acute when 
discovery of electronically stored information is sought”).  See also Harding, supra note 
2, at 466 n.3 (collecting cases “raising the issue of the waiver consequence of 
inadvertently produced privileged documents”). 
7 See John T. Hundley, Annotation, Waiver of Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent 
Disclosure – State Law, 51 A.L.R. 5th 603 (2004). 
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Berkeley (SIMS) have undertaken to answer that question. The results are 
staggering, requiring the use of descriptive terms foreign to even the 
“advanced” personal computer user.  In 2002, people created five exabytes 
of new information, ninety-two percent of which was stored on magnetic 
media, and the bulk of that was on hard disks.8  How big is an “exabyte?”  
One exabyte is equal to 1,000,000,000,000,000,000, or 1018 bytes.9  Five 
exabytes is “equivalent in size to the information contained in half a 
million new libraries the size of the Library of Congress print 
collections.”10  In fact, according to these researchers, five exabytes is 
twenty-five times all the printed information in the world.11 
 
[4]  Numbers such as these are virtually beyond comprehension. It is 
likely that the vast majority of the information being generated will never 
be the subject of any form of discovery, certainly not in any individual 
lawsuit.  Nevertheless, even on a scale that litigants deal with everyday, 
the volume of available information is incredible, and increasing at an 
incredible rate.12  For example, a single CD-ROM can hold approximately 
650 megabytes (MB) of information, or the amount of information 
contained in over sixteen feet of shelved books.13  A single DVD can hold 
4.3 gigabytes (GB), more than six times the content of a CD.  An average 
laptop computer, with a 40GB hard drive, could house enough information 
to fill a small library!14  Consider also the transformation of 
communication from print and oral methods to electronic.  The U.S. Postal 
Service is expected to deliver 212 billion pieces of mail in 2006.15  In 
comparison, computer users sent approximately 31 billion e-mail 
                                                 
8 Peter Lyman and Hal R. Varian, How Much Information? 2003, 
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/how-much-info-2003/execsum.htm (last visited on April 
21, 2006). 
9 Id. Exec. Summary, tbl.1.1. 
10 Id. Exec. Summary, pt.I. 
11 Id. 
12 See Judicial Conference Report, supra note 6, at 22 (“Electronically stored information 
is characterized by exponentially greater volume than hard-copy documents”). 
13 Lyman and Varian, supra note 8 , Exec. Summary, tbl.1.1 (estimating that 100MB is 
equivalent to one meter of shelved books). 
14 Id. Exec. Summary, pt.III, D.  
15 United States Postal Service Key Facts, Postal Facts 2006, 
http://www.usps.com/communications/organization/postalfacts.htm (last visited April 21, 
2006). 
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messages every day in 2002, “a figure which [was] expected to double by 
2006.”16   
 
[5]  While not all of the electronic information being generated is business 
data likely to be subject to discovery in litigation, the volume of business 
information potentially subject to discovery is stunning, and becomes 
more so with each passing year.17  Moreover, most of that information is 
stored electronically – between seventy and ninety-five percent,18 and “as 
much as fifty percent of information generated by companies never gets 
printed” on paper.19  This information explosion is reflected in the amount 
of information being generated by the average business employee in the 
United States.  According to the researchers at SIMS, on a world-wide 
basis the average person generates almost 800MB of information each 
year.20  However, fifty percent of the information generated world-wide 
that is stored on magnetic media (which, as noted above, accounts for 
ninety-two percent of all information generated) is created in the United 
States.21  Thus, the average person in the United States generated over 
three gigabytes of information in 2002 alone.22   
                                                 
16 Lyman and Varian, supra note 8, Exec. Summary, pt.IV, C. See also David K. Isom, 
Electronic Discovery Primer for Judges, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 n.72 and 
accompanying text (asserting that “[o]ver three billion business e-mails . . . are sent each 
day in the United States, most of which are archived”); Judicial Conference Report, supra 
note 6, at 23 (“large organizations[] . . . receive 250 to 300 million e-mail messages 
monthly”). 
17 Judicial Conference Report, supra note 6, at 22-23 (“examples of such volume include 
the capacity of large organizations’ computer networks to store information in terabytes, 
each of which represents the equivalent of 500 million typewritten pages of plain text”). 
18 Laura Catherine Daniel, Note, The Dubious Origins and Dangers of Clawback and 
Quick-Peek Agreements: An Argument Against Their Codification in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663, 663 (2005). 
19 Id. at 663-64. 
20 Lyman and Varian, supra note 8.  
21 Id. 
22 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there were 281,421,906 people living in the 
United States as of April 1, 2000.  U.S. Census Bureau, United States Census 2000, 
http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).  As noted, 
ninety-two percent of the five exabytes of information generated in 2002 existed on 
magnetic media, and fifty percent of that information was created in the United States 
(Lyman and Varian, supra note 8).  According to the SIMS researchers, three gigabytes 
of information would be equivalent to three pick-up trucks filled with books.  Id. 
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[6]  Put in perspective then, attorneys in the United States should expect 
that nearly every person having relevant knowledge of the issues in any 
given lawsuit will have generated a significant amount of discoverable 
information, and the majority of that information will be located on 
computer systems rather than in file cabinets.  As a result, the volume of 
information that attorneys must review in the course of discovery is 
increasing exponentially, while the statutory and rule-based time frames 
for accomplishing that review are not.  The inevitable result will be the 
inadvertent production of privileged information.   
 
III. TRADITIONAL WAIVER CONCEPTS 
 
[7]  To fully appreciate the impact of the ever-increasing volume of 
discoverable information, one must first revisit the governing law 
concerning waiver of the attorney-client privilege.  The attorney-client 
privilege “dates back to the 16th century and is believed to be the oldest of 
the confidential privileges known to the common law.”23  Its importance in 
encouraging “full and frank communication between attorneys and their 
clients,”24 however, is “inconsistent with the general duty to disclose and 
may impede the truth-seeking function” of the justice system.25  As a 
result, the privilege is narrowly circumscribed and may be waived under 
certain circumstances.26 
 
[8]  Of particular interest here is the inadvertent disclosure of privileged 
communications in the course of discovery.27  Most federal and state 
                                                 
23 Alexander C. Black, Annotation, What Persons or Entities May Assert or Waive 
Corporation’s Attorney-Client Privilege – Modern Cases, 28 A.L.R. 5th 1, § 2 (1995).  
See also Hardgrove, supra  note 3, at 645 (dating the attorney-client privilege to “the 
reign of Elizabeth I”).  Cf. Harding, supra note 2, at n.84 (“The attorney-client privilege 
has its roots in Roman Law”). 
24 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
25 Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 643. 
26 Id. at 651-52. 
27 A threshold issue in any such case is whether the disclosure was, in fact, inadvertent.  
This is a question of fact that must be decided on a case-by-case basis, but, in the 
circumstances under consideration here, disclosure in the course of discovery as part of 
the production of a large volume of predominantly electronically-stored information, the 
inadvertence of the disclosure is not likely to be a significant issue.  See Judicial 
Conference Report, supra note 6, at 27 (“The volume of the information and the forms in 
which it is stored may make privilege determinations more difficult and privilege review 
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courts generally follow one of three approaches to the problem, although 
some state courts follow a fourth.28 
 
A. STRICT LIABILITY 
 
[9]  The simplest approach to dealing with the inadvertent waiver of 
privileged information is the strict liability or per se approach.29  Under 
this approach “all inadvertent disclosures that arise as a result of 
negligence constitute a waiver.”30  The rationale behind the strict liability 
approach is two-fold.  First, since the purpose of the attorney-client 
privilege is to protect confidential communications, once a communication 
has been disclosed to a third party it is, by definition, no longer 
confidential.31  In other words, after the confidential information has been 
disclosed, “‘the bell has already rung, and the court cannot . . . unring it . . 
. .’”32  Second, because the existence of the privilege depends in part on 
the parties’ effort to maintain the confidence, some courts are reluctant to 
grant “greater protection to those who assert the privilege than their own 
                                                                                                                         
correspondingly more expensive and time-consuming, yet less likely to detect all 
privileged information.  Inadvertent production is increasingly likely to occur.”).   
28 See generally Hundley, supra note 7. 
29 Jason C. Seewer, Pressure on Corporate America: The Appropriateness of a Per Se 
Rule for Waiver of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1041, 
1044 (2004). 
30 Anne G. Bruckner-Harvey, Inadvertent Disclosure in the Age of Fax Machines: Is the 
Cat Really Out of the Bag?, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 385, 388 (1994). 
31 Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 649 (“The requirement that the communication be 
‘confidential’ is strictly applied in that the existence of the attorney-client relationship 
does not by itself raise a presumption of confidentiality.  This element requires that 
confidentiality be intended by the attorney and client, and the precautions taken by the 
parties to ensure confidentiality may be considered as bearing on intent.”). 
32 Harmony Gold U.S.A. Inc. v. FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113, 118 (N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(quoting Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 183 (N.D. Cal. 1990)).  In 
Harmony Gold, the court adopted the strict liability approach, but noted that the same 
conclusion would have resulted had it applied the multi-factor test applied by the court in 
Bud Antle. See also Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 811 (1990) (denying motion requesting return of inadvertently disclosed work 
product because “granting the motion would do no more than seal the bag from which the 
cat has already escaped”). 
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precautions warrant.”33  Thus under the per se approach any disclosure, 
voluntary or otherwise, waives the privilege. 
 
[10]  Perhaps the most often cited case applying the strict liability 
approach is In re: Sealed Case, in which the court relied on the second 
rationale for the per se rule – that parties should not be protected from 
their own negligence. 34  In that case, a government contractor was under 
investigation by a grand jury for tax evasion and fraud.  During the course 
of the investigation, the grand jury issued a subpoena for documents 
related to certain adjustments made to the company’s books.  The 
company withheld from the production six documents it claimed were 
exempt from disclosure as privileged attorney-client communications.35  
The district court granted the government’s motion to compel production 
of the documents, but the company continued to refuse and was held in 
contempt.36  While the contempt order was on appeal, the government 
learned that one of the documents had been disclosed to a different 
government agency during a routine audit of travel expenses, and 
contended that any privilege had been waived as a result of that 
disclosure.37  The company, however, contended that the disclosure had 
been “‘a bureaucratic error.’”38  Noting that the district court had 
determined that the disclosure was voluntary, the D.C. Circuit wrote that it 
did not matter “whether the waiver is labeled ‘voluntary’ or 
                                                 
33 In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Although the attorney-client 
privilege is of ancient lineage and continuing importance, the confidentiality of 
communications covered by the privilege must be jealously guarded by the holder of the 
privilege lest it be waived.”).  See also Int’l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp. 
120 F.R.D. 445, 450 (quoting In re Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp. 77 B.R. 324, 330 (1987) 
(“‘inadvertence is, after all, merely a euphemism for negligence, and, certainly . . . one is 
expected to pay a price for one’s negligence’”) (omission in original). 
34 In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (1989). See also Buckner-Harvey, supra note 30, at 
389.  For examples of sources citing In re Sealed Case see, e.g., Daniel, supra note 18 at 
674-675; Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 657, n.107; Harding, supra note 2 at 472 n.21; 
Hundly, supra note 2, at §§ 3a, 8, 16(b)-(c); Gloria A. Kristopek, Note, To Peek or Not to 
Peek: Inadvertent or Unsolicited Disclosure of Documents to Opposing Counsel, 33 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 643, 654 n.57 (1999); Amy M. Fulmer Stevenson, Comment, Making a Wrong 
Turn on the Information Superhighway: Electronic Mail, the Attorney-Client Privilege 
and Inadvertent Disclosure, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 347, 360 n.91 (1997). 
35 In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 977. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 980. 
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‘inadvertent.’”39  The court then held that a party cannot rely on its own 
negligence to avoid a finding of waiver: 
 
The courts will grant no greater protection to those who 
assert the privilege than their own precautions warrant. We 
therefore agree with those courts which have held that the 
privilege is lost “‘even if the disclosure is inadvertent . . . 
.’” To hold, as we do, that an inadvertent disclosure will 
waive the privilege imposes a self-governing restraint on 
the freedom with which organizations such as corporations, 
unions, and the like label documents related to 
communications with counsel as privileged . . . . In other 
words, if a client wishes to preserve the privilege, it must 
treat the confidentiality of attorney-client communications 
like jewels – if not crown jewels. Short of court-compelled 
disclosure, or other equally extraordinary circumstances, 
we will not distinguish between various degrees of 
“voluntariness” in waivers of the attorney-client privilege.40 
 
[11]  In International Digital Systems Corporation v. Digital Equipment 
Corporation,41 the court relied on the first rationale for the strict liability 
rule – that disclosure destroys the confidentiality of the formerly 
privileged communication.  In that case, the plaintiff reviewed 500,000 
documents in response to discovery, including two separate reviews to 
identify privileged communications.42  Nevertheless, the plaintiff 
inadvertently produced twenty privileged documents to the defendant and 
subsequently sought an order to compel their return.43  Although the court 
critiqued the privilege review process in detail, ultimately concluding that 
the “Post-It” notes that were used to identify the privileged materials were 
either never affixed to the subject documents, mistakenly removed, or 
simply overlooked, it stated emphatically that it was not relying on any 
deficiencies in the review process in concluding that the privilege had 
been waived.44  As the court explained: 
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 Id. (quoting In re Grand-Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1984).  
41 Int’l Digital Sys. Corp., 120 F.R.D. at 445. 
42 Id. at 446-447. 
43 Id. at 446. 
44 Id. at 448-449. 
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I see little benefit to doing a painstaking evaluation of the 
precautions taken by plaintiff’s counsel when it is noted 
that the whole basis for the privilege is to maintain the 
confidentiality of the document. It cannot be doubted that 
the confidentiality of the document has been destroyed by 
the ‘inadvertent’ disclosure no less than if the disclosure 
had been purposeful; it equally cannot be doubted that the 
confidentiality of the communication can never be restored, 
regardless of whether the disclosure was ‘inadvertent’ or 
purposeful. In other words, regardless of how painstaking 
the precautions, there is no order I can enter which erases 
from defendant’s counsel’s knowledge what has been 
disclosed. There is no order which can remedy what has 
occurred, regardless of whether or not the precautions were 
sufficient.45 
 
[12]  The beauty of the strict liability approach is its simplicity – all that 
needs be determined is the fact of disclosure.  All else is irrelevant to the 
inquiry.  The per se rule is also the approach that best serves the 
underlying purpose of discovery, full disclosure in the search for the truth, 
and provides the greatest incentive “for attorneys to take due care with 
their client’s documents.”46  From the producing party’s perspective, 
however, the strict liability approach is obviously the most restrictive of 
the privilege, and some courts view it as “too harsh in light of the vast 




[13]  The opposite extreme of the per se approach is the view that 
privilege can only intentionally be waived.  Under the rationale that a 
waiver, by definition, involves the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right, a minority of courts have held that “there must have been some 
                                                 
45 Id. at 449 (emphasis in original). 
46 Daniel, supra note 18, at 675. 
47 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.  v. Marine Midland Realty Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 481 (E.D. 
Va. 1991).  See also Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 658 (arguing that the strict liability 
approach is inflexible, will “foster and condone sharp practice,” and “ignores the purpose 
behind the privilege – encouraging full disclosure with an attorney – for the sake of 
punishing accidental and technical disclosures”). 
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intent by the party involved to make the disclosure before there can be a 
waiver.”48  Because the privilege belongs to the client and not the attorney, 
the inadvertent disclosure by the attorney cannot possibly be imputed to 
the client who did not know of, and therefore could not have authorized, 
the disclosure.49   
 
[14]  The intent-required approach was adopted by the court in 
Transportation Equip. Sales Corp. v. BMY Wheeled Vehicles.50  The 
defendant in that case had produced in discovery two copies of a 
privileged letter, one redacted and one original, and sought an order 
requiring the return of the unredacted version.51  The court found there 
could be “no contention that the document's disclosure was in any way 
willful, or resulted from anything other than oversight and mistake on the 
part of defendant's counsel.”52  Acknowledging that there were cases in 
other jurisdictions that had applied the strict liability approach, the court 
held the disadvantages of that approach outweighed its benefits: 
 
This waiver approach has the virtues of simplicity and ease 
of application. Weighing against those virtues – and they 
are the only virtues that I can perceive – is the likelihood 
that this approach will foster and condone sharp practice, 
distrust, and animosity among lawyers – none of which 
does anything to accomplish justice fairly and 
expeditiously. In addition, such approach encourages, in the  
                                                 
48 Hundley, supra note 2, at § 4a. 
49 Id.  Some have identified Dean Wigmore as a staunch advocate of the strict liability 
rule, based on his criticism of the intent-required approach on the grounds that a 
“privileged person would seldom be found to waive, if his intention not to abandon could 
alone control the situation.”  8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2327 (1961).  
Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, given the rampant inconsistency in the 
jurisprudence, Wigmore can also be cited in favor of the intent-required approach, as 
with his comment that communications “made in confidence by the client are at his 
instance permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor except 
the protection be waived.”  Id. at § 2292.  
50 Transp. Equip. Sales Corp. v. BMY Wheeled Vehicles, 930 F. Supp. 1187, 1188 (N.D. 
Ohio 1996). 
51 Id. at 1187. 
52 Id. 
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party to whom inadvertent disclosure is made, incaution 
where care should be taken.53 
 
The court then adopted the position taken by the American Bar 
Association (ABA) Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
in its now withdrawn Formal Opinion 92-368, which required the recipient 
of an inadvertently produced privileged communication to “‘refrain from 
examining the materials, notify the sending lawyer and abide by the 
instructions of the lawyer who sent them.’”54 
 
C. MULTI-FACTOR ANALYSIS 
 
[15]  Between these two extreme positions lies the majority rule, which 
requires a case-by-case, multi-factor analysis to determine if an 
inadvertent disclosure waives the privilege.55  This approach attempts to 
strike a balance between protecting the client who intended that her 
communications remain confidential, and “not reliev[ing] those claiming 
the privilege of the consequences of their carelessness if the circumstances 
surrounding the disclosure do not clearly demonstrate that continued 
protection is warranted.”56  The court will consider several factors in 
determining whether an inadvertent disclosure should waive the privilege: 
(1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken by the party to prevent 
disclosure; (2) any delay between the disclosure and the attempt to rectify 
the error; (3) the scope of discovery; (4) the extent of the inadvertent 
disclosure, including the relative volume of privileged information 
disclosed compared to the total volume of information produced; and (5) 
any overriding issues of fairness, including whether the receiving party 
has relied on the information produced.57 
                                                 
53 Id. at 1187-88. 
54 Id. at 1188 (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Form Op. 368 
(1992) (“Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Materials”)). 
55 Daniel, supra note 18, at 679-80. See also, Hundley, supra note 2, at § 5. 
56 Stevenson, supra note 34, at 362 (quoting Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 
1434 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
57 See Hundley, supra, note 2, at § 5.  Some courts applying the multi-factor test purport 
to apply a four-factor test, excluding the scope of discovery as a factor.  See, e.g., Atronic 
Int’l GMBH v. SAI Semispecialists of America, Inc., 232 F.R.D. 160, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005) (balancing ““(1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken by the producing party 
to prevent inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents; (2) the volume of discovery 
versus the extent of the specific disclosure issue; (3) the length of time taken by the 
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[16]  Perhaps the first case involving the production of a large number of 
documents to recognize the need to consider more factors than simply the 
fact of disclosure and the producing party’s intent was Transamerica 
Computer v. International Business Machines.58  In that case, the plaintiff 
sought to compel production of certain allegedly privileged materials59 
that the defendant, International Business Machines (IBM), had 
inadvertently produced in a prior antitrust lawsuit.60  Acknowledging the 
case law on both the strict liability and intent-required tests, the court 
examined in detail the circumstances under which the disclosure had been 
made and held that, under those circumstances, any applicable privilege 
had not been waived.61   
 
[17]  Specifically, the court found that (1) IBM had been ordered to 
complete its production of approximately 17 million pages of documents 
in only three months (scope of production) 62; (2) that “IBM mounted a 
                                                                                                                         
producing party to rectify the disclosure; and (4) the overarching issue of fairness”).  
However, in many cases, such as Atronic, in which the disclosures were made as part of 
mandatory disclosures under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B), the scope of discovery is not an 
issue.  It is also apparent that some courts confuse the “scope” of discovery with the 
volume of information produced compared to the number of privileged documents.  See, 
e.g.,  Monarch Cement Co. v. Lone Star Indus., 132 F.R.D. 558, 560 (D. Kan. 1990) ( 
“The scope of discovery undertaken in this case also leads us to conclude that a finding of 
waiver would be inappropriate.  More than 9,000 pages of documents were produced, and 
the documents in question were only eight pages contained in one of 118 personnel files 
produced.”)  The fact that courts articulate and apply the five standards with considerable 
variation further argues for a definitive standard.  
58 Transamerica Computer v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978). 
59 The Ninth Circuit assumed for purposes of its analysis that the documents in question 
were privileged and addressed only the issue of waiver.  It noted that, having determined 
that there was no waiver, the district court would have to determine whether each of the 
documents in question was actually privileged.  Id. at 647 n.2. 
60 Id. at 646-47. 
61 The court relied, at least in part, on the principle “that a party does not waive the 
attorney-client privilege for documents which he is compelled to produce.”  Id. at 651.  
Based on its review of the circumstances, the court held that IBM had effectively been 
compelled to produce the subject documents.  Id. at 651-52.  In addition, the court found 
it significant that the trial judge in the prior litigation had entered an order specifically 
holding that IBM had not waived its privilege with respect to any inadvertently produced 
documents.  Id. at 649-50.  Nonetheless, the court also noted that its “conclusion that 
IBM did not waive its claim to its privilege . . . [was] based on [its] independent analysis 
of the circumstances surrounding IBM’s inadvertent production.”  Id. at 652. 
62 Id. at 648. 
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herculean [sic] effort to review and produce the materials,” including a 
review of “each and every one of the 17 million pages” (reasonableness of 
precautions) 63; (3) that IBM realized shortly after the screening process 
began that “privileged documents were evading detection by its 
reviewers” and undertook remedial action, which included a special 
review of any documents selected by the plaintiff for production to 
identify any privileged materials and withhold them from the final 
production (delay in identifying and attempting to rectify the error) 64; and 
(4) that “a relatively small number, 1138 (approximately 5800 pages), of 
supposedly privileged documents were inadvertently produced” to the 
plaintiff (extent of disclosure).65  Thus, although it did not articulate them 
individually as have courts in more recent decisions, the Transamerica 
court considered all five of the factors that subsequent courts have 
considered in applying the multi-factor test.66 
 
                                                 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 649-50.  The element of delay is one that has generated significant variation in 
the case law.  Compare Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 183 (N.D. 
Cal. 1990) (finding that “[w]hile plaintiffs acted to recover [the document] as soon as 
they found it had been inadvertently produced, this was not until six weeks after 
production”) (emphasis in original), with Premiere Digital Access, Inc. v. Cent. Tel. Co., 
360 F. Supp.2d 1168, 1171-1176 (D. Nev. 2005) (finding no waiver of privilege for a 
document that had been produced in Rule 26 disclosures where the disclosure was not 
discovered until nearly one year later).  Most cases hold that the relevant time period for 
evaluating the producing party’s diligence begins once the party discovers, or reasonably 
should have discovered, the disclosure, rather than at the time of the disclosure itself.  
See, e.g., Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 574, 577 (D. Kan. 1997) (“[t]he relevant time 
for rectifying any error begins when a party discovered or with reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the inadvertent disclosure”) (citing Kansas City Power & Light 
Co. v. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co., 133 F.R.D. 171, 172 (1989)); Aramony v. 
United Way of America, 969 F. Supp. 226, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The period after the 
producing party realizes that privileged information has been disclosed is the relevant 
period for measuring whether the privilege has been waived”) (citing Georgia-Pacific 
Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93 Civ. 5125, 1995 WL 117871, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 20, 1995) (citing Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co. v. Servotronics, Inc., 132 A.D.2d 392, 
400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)). 
65 Transamerica Compuer Co., 573 F.2d at 648-50. 
66 The application of the fifth factor, overriding interests of fairness, includes its 
recognition that IBM was operating under a very tight schedule in circumstances that 
amounted to a compelled production of documents.  Id. at 651. 
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[18]  A more recent case specifically considering each of the five factors is 
United States v. Keystone Sanitation Company.67  There one group of 
defendants in a Superfund action, the “Generator Defendants,” sought the 
billing records of the attorneys for another group of defendants, the 
“Keystone Defendants,” to show that the latter had been disposing of 
assets to avoid paying their share of any ultimate liability.68  The 
Generator Defendants contended that any privilege that had attached to the 
records had been waived when the Keystone Defendants produced two e-
mail messages from their attorneys on the same subject matter.69  The 
Keystone Defendants, in turn, contended that the e-mail messages had 
been inadvertently produced, and that the privilege should not, therefore, 
be deemed waived.70 
 
[19]  Applying the multi-factor analysis, the court held first that the 
Keystone Defendants failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent the 
disclosure in light of the fact that the court had imposed no short deadlines 
for the production, and had not been petitioned for additional time for 
review.71  The court then found that the relative number of documents 
produced was small (two documents from a large production), which 
favored the Keystone Defendants, but that the extent of the disclosure was 
complete in that the e-mail messages disclosed “precisely the type of 
information sought from the billing and time statements,” which would 
favor the Generator Defendants.72  Next, the court acknowledged that 
there was no significant delay between the document production and the 
Keystone Defendants’ attempt to rectify the disclosure, a factor that would 
have supported upholding the privilege.73  Finally, the court held that the 
overriding issue of fairness “weighs squarely in favor of waiver” because, 
“[t]o preclude discovery as to whether principal potentially responsible 
parties are or were engaged in the deliberate dissipation of assets for the 
purpose of avoiding a share of liability . . . runs counter to the interests of 
justice.”74 
                                                 
67 United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., 885 F. Supp. 672 (M.D. Pa. 1994). 
68 Id. at 675. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 676. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 United States, supra note 67, at 676.   
74 Id. 
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[20]  The multi-factor analysis, though fact-specific and therefore 
susceptible to inconsistent results,75 is the only test that recognizes and 
attempts to account for the tension between the confidentiality of a client’s 
communications to her attorney and the truth-seeking purposes of liberal 
discovery.76 
 
D. SIGNIFICANT PART TEST 
 
[21]  Some state courts apply a fourth analysis, based on Cal. Evid. Code § 
912(a), adopted in 1965, which provides that the privilege is waived if a 
significant portion has been disclosed with the consent of the holder: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the right of 
any person to claim a privilege [under various statutory 
provisions, including the “lawyer-client privilege”] is 
waived with respect to a communication protected by the 
privilege if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, 
has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has 
consented to disclosure made by anyone.  Consent to 
disclosure is manifested by any statement or other conduct 
of the holder of the privilege indicating consent to the 
disclosure, including failure to claim the privilege in any 
proceeding in which the holder has the legal standing and 
opportunity to claim the privilege.77 
 
A number of state courts have applied a “significant part” analysis to an 
inadvertent disclosure with varying results.78   
 
                                                 
75 See Bruckner-Harvey, supra note 30, at 390. 
76 Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 659 (“This discretionary test attempts to strike a balance 
between the competing interests of encouraging complete disclosure of facts to attorneys 
and requiring that the confidences involved in privileged communication be carefully 
guarded”).   
77 CAL. EVID. CODE § 912(a) (West 2005).  
78 Hundley, supra note 2, at § 6(a).  Although many federal courts consider the extent of 
the disclosure in the multi-factor analysis, “few of the federal courts have adopted the 
‘significant part’ reasoning in the sense that California arguably has.”  However, at least 
one federal court appears to have adopted a “significant part” analysis based on the 
proposed Fed. R. Evid. 5-11, which was later rejected by Congress.  See id. (citing 
Champion Int’l Corp. v. Int’l Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Ga. 1980)). 
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E. THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAIVER 
 
[22]  Also important to consider is the scope of waiver potentially effected 
by an inadvertent disclosure.  A waiver of privilege as a result of the 
inadvertent disclosure of one document may extend vertically, meaning 
that the privilege is waived as to the entire world, and horizontally, 
meaning that the waiver may extend to additional documents and 
information.79  Although a detailed analysis of this topic is beyond the 
scope of this article, it is important for present purposes to recognize that 
there is a great deal of variation in both the standards applied and the 
results achieved.   
 
[23]  Generally speaking, courts will apply one of three standards: subject 
matter waiver, limited waiver, or no waiver.80  Courts applying subject 
matter waiver hold that the privilege is waived not only for the specific 
communication that was disclosed, but for all documents and 
communications on the same subject matter.81  Courts applying the limited 
waiver standard will hold that the privilege is waived only for the specific 
communication that was disclosed.82  Some courts will find that there is no 
waiver at all when the privileged documents are disclosed inadvertently.83  
Unfortunately the standards are applied inconsistently, depending on the 
                                                 
79 Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 661. 
80 Hundley, supra note 2, at §§ 7-10. 
81 See, e.g., Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Dept. of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883-84 
(1st Cir. 1995) (“a waiver premised on inadvertent disclosure will be deemed to 
encompass ‘all other such communications on the same subject.’”) (quoting Weil v. 
Inv./Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981)).  See also 
Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 662 (noting that subject matter waiver may be interpreted 
broadly or narrowly, depending on the circumstances). 
82 See, e.g., Koch Materials Co. v. Shore Slurry Seal, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 109, 120 (D.N.J 
2002) (holding that ‘“[t]he general rule that a disclosure waives not only the specific 
communication but also the subject matter of it in other communications is not 
appropriate in the case of inadvertent disclosure, unless it is obvious that a party is 
attempting to gain an advantage or make offensive or unfair use of the disclosure’”) 
(quoting Parkway Gallery Furniture v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, 116 F.R.D. 
46, 52 (M.D.N.C. 1987)). 
83 See, e.g., Maldonado v. Admin. Office of the Courts-Prob. Div., 225 F.R.D. 120, 129-
32 (D.N.J. 2004) (applying multi-factor analysis to find no waiver even where disclosure 
was complete, the privileged information having appeared in an amended complaint, 
because the producing party “took reasonable precautions to avoid disclosure of the 
[privileged] letter”). 
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circumstances.  For example, courts will construe the scope of the “subject 
matter” more narrowly or broadly depending on a variety of factors.84  As 
a result, it is perhaps more profitable to consider the factors that courts 
will consider than the standards themselves. 
 
[24]  Among the factors that courts have relied upon in determining the 
scope of waiver are the following: (1) potential prejudice to the privilege-
holder’s adversary; (2) the extent to which the privilege-holder has 
selectively disclosed information for strategic purposes; (3) the extent to 
which the privilege-holder has cooperated with, or frustrated, the 
discovery process; (4) whether the disclosure was intentional or 
inadvertent; and (5) the care with which the privilege-holder managed its 
confidential communications.85  Not surprisingly, some of these factors 
are the same as those applied to determine whether the privilege has been 
waived at all under the multi-factor analysis, and with the same results: 
increased culpability on the part of the privilege-holder generally will 
result in an increased scope of waiver.86  Thus, the dilemma remains for 
the attorney charged with production of the increasingly large volumes of 
electronically-stored information.   
 
F. A LACK OF GUIDANCE 
 
[25]  As suggested above, the standards applied by the courts in 
determining whether there has been a waiver when privileged 
communications are inadvertently disclosed, and, if so, the extent of the 
waiver, are inconsistent and inconsistently applied – both at the federal 
and state levels.  A number of analyses have been undertaken attempting 
to identify the approach adopted by the various federal and state courts, 
                                                 
84 Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 661-62.  See also Hundley, supra note 2, at § 8 n.54 
(noting that “courts from virtually all of the circuits” have applied all three of the scope 
of waiver standards, “suggesting that, although the courts often speak in terms of an 
absolute rule, the circumstances of the particular case often determine the result that will 
be reached”). 
85 Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 662. 
86 Compare Hundley, supra note 2, at § 7 (“in general it is apparent that courts do not like 
applying subject matter waiver where the initial disclosure has been a mistake”) with 
Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 674-75 (arguing that courts apply the various standards 
inconsistently and arbitrarily). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue 4 
 
19 
not surprisingly with somewhat inconsistent results.87  The following 
charts are based on the analysis performed by Hundley in Waiver of 
Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent Disclosure – Federal Law88 and 
Waiver of Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent Disclosure – State Law89 
and include courts that have adopted the referenced approach either 
expressly or by implication: 
                                                 
87 Compare Hundley, supra note 2, and Hundley, supra note 7, with Harding supra, note 
2. 
88 Hundley, supra note 2.  
89 Hundley, supra note 2.  
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As is readily evident, litigants are often at a loss to predict with any degree 
of certainty the standard that will be applied to an inadvertent disclosure of 
privileged information.   
 
[26]  For example, courts in the Second Circuit have applied all three 
standards in cases involving disclosure of attorney-client information.  In 
re Horowitz involved a federal grand jury subpoena duces tecum issued 
for the contents of three file cabinets in the possession of an accountant.90  
The owners of the documents moved to quash the subpoena on the 
grounds that, among other things, certain of the documents were 
privileged attorney-client communications.91  The court concluded, 
however, that any privilege that had attached to the documents had been 
waived when the owners gave their accountant unrestricted access to the 
documents for purposes unrelated to obtaining legal advice.92 
 
[27]  In contrast, the court in Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields93 
applied the intent-required test.  Connecticut Mutual was an action by 
certain bond holders against the bond underwriter for misrepresentation.94  
In a motion to compel answers to certain questions posed at the 
deposition, the defendant contended that some of the questions called for 
privileged information, while the plaintiffs argued that any privilege had 
been waived because the defendant had disclosed certain letters that 
contained the same information sought in the deposition.  The court, 
however, held that “to support a finding of waiver, there must be evidence 
that [the defendant] intended to waive” the privilege. 95  Because the letters 
had been inadvertently disclosed, there was no waiver.96 
 
[28]  Finally, in SEC v. Cassano,97 the court applied the multi-factor test to 
find a waiver.  During the course of discovery, the SEC made available to 
                                                 
90 In re Horowitz 482 F.2d 72, 72-75 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973). 
91 Id. at 75. 
92 Id. at 80-82 (“[i]t is not asking too much to insist that if a client wishes to preserve the 
privilege . . . , he must take some affirmative action to preserve confidentiality”). 
93 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y 1955). 
94 Id. at 450. 
95 Id. at 451. 
96 Id. 
97 SEC v. Cassano, 189 F.R.D. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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the defendants between 50 and 52 boxes of documents for inspection.98  
Early in the review, attorneys for the defendants discovered a 100 page 
memorandum prepared by SEC staff attorneys.99  The defendants 
requested that a copy be made immediately, prior to the copying and 
production of any other documents selected during the review, and an SEC 
attorney agreed without first reviewing or even identifying the 
document.100  After confirming that the document did not appear on the 
privilege log, counsel for the defendants distributed the document to his 
colleagues and clients.  Twelve days later, the SEC realized that the 
document had been produced and moved for its return.101  The court held 
that the privilege had been waived because the SEC failed to take adequate 
steps to protect the document, including failing to ensure that it was not 
privileged when the defendants requested specifically that it be copied.102  
Moreover, although the SEC moved promptly to recover the document 
after discovering it had been produced, the defendants had already widely 
distributed the document, and fairness dictated that the court not disregard 
SEC’s carelessness.103 
 
IV. A PROBLEM UNRESOLVED 
 
[29]  Inadvertent disclosure of privileged information is not a new issue, 
and the particular problems associated with electronically-stored 
information have been recognized and addressed – to the extent they can 
be – in procedural rules, ethics rules and discovery standards.  None, 
however, resolve the underlying conflict with the substantive law. 
 
A. THE FEDERAL RULES 
 
[30]  The Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (Judicial Conference) approved a number of changes to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “aimed at discovery of electronically 
stored information.”104  Recognizing the increasing likelihood that 
                                                 
98 Id. at 84. 
99 Id. at 83-84. 
100 Id. at 84-85. 
101 Id. at 85. 
102 Id. at 85-86. 
103 SEC, supra note 97, at 86.  
104 Judicial Conference Report, supra note 6, at 22.  
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privileged information will be inadvertently disclosed as discovery of 
electronically stored information becomes more common, the Committee 
approved amendments to Rules 16 and 26 in an effort to deal with the 
problem: 
 
The problems that can result from efforts to guard against 
privilege waiver often become more acute when discovery 
of electronically stored information is sought.  The volume 
of the information and the forms in which it is stored may 
make privilege determinations more difficult and privilege 
review correspondingly more expensive and time-
consuming, yet less likely to detect all privileged 
information.  Inadvertent production is increasingly likely 
to occur.  Because the failure to screen out even one 
privileged item may result in an argument that there has 
been a waiver as to all other privileged materials related to 
the same subject matter, early attention to this problem is 
more important as electronic discovery becomes more 
common.105 
 
Specifically, “[u]nder the proposed amendments to Rules 26(f) and 16, if 
the parties are able to reach an agreement to adopt protocols for asserting 
privilege and work-product protection claims that will facilitate discovery 
that is faster and at lower cost, they may ask the court to include such 
arrangements in a case-management or other order.”106  
 
[31]  In addition, the Committee also approved an amendment to Rule 
26(b)(5) to create “a procedure for asserting privilege after production that 
is parallel to the similar proposals for Rules 16 and 26(f).”107  Because 
“inadvertent production of privileged or protected material is a substantial 
risk,” the “proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(5) clarifies the procedure to 
apply when a responding party asserts a claim of privilege or of work-
product protection after production.”108  The new procedure requires the 
party that has inadvertently produced privileged information to notify the 
                                                 
105 Id. at 27. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 29. 
108 Id. 
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receiving party of its privilege claim as well as the basis for it.109  Upon 
receiving notice, the receiving party will be required to “return, sequester, 
or destroy the information, and may not use it or disclose it to third parties 
until the claim is resolved.”110  Moreover, if the receiving party has 
already disclosed the information to a third party, it will be required to 
take reasonable steps to get it back.111  The rule will also give the 
receiving party the option of submitting the allegedly privileged materials 
to the court to determine if the information was, in fact, privileged, and if 
so, whether the privilege had been waived.112 
 
[32]  In approving the amendments, the Committee cautions repeatedly 
that the new rules will not protect a party from the substantive law 
regarding waiver if it conflicts with the approved procedures.113  Thus, 
the “proposed amendment [to Rule 26(b)(5)] does not address the 
substantive questions whether privilege or work product protection has 
been waived or forfeited.”114  In fact, the Committee revised the proposed 
amendments to Rule 26(b)(5) twice to avoid any apparent conflict with 
substantive waiver law.  First, the Committee rejected a prior version of 
the amendment that required the producing party to notify the receiving 
party within a reasonable time because of its potential conflict with 
substantive waiver law.115  Second, the version of the rule published for 
                                                 
109 Id.   
110 Judicial Conference Report, supra note 6, at 29. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 See, e.g., id. (stating that the proposed rules do “not attempt to change the rules that 
determine whether production waives the privilege or protection asserted”).  Indeed, the 
Committee takes pains to make clear that it did not intend to “trigger the special statutory 
process for adopting rules that modify privilege.”  Id. at 29-30. 
114 Judicial Conference Report, supra note 6, at Rules App. C-54. 
115 Id. at C-55 (“Under the law of many jurisdictions, whether a party asserted a privilege 
claim within a reasonable time is important to determining whether there is a waiver; 
focusing on a reasonable time might carry implications inconsistent with the Committee’s 
intent to avoid the substantive law of privilege and privilege waiver.”)  This revision 
apparently contributed to four Committee members voting against the amendment to 
Rule 26(b)(5) because of their fear that “the new procedure could be used to disrupt 
litigation, particularly if the claim of privilege or work-product was made late in the 
case.”  Judicial Conference Report, supra note 6, at 30.  The majority, however, “did not 
share the concern that parties would deliberately delay a claim of privilege or work 
product because to do so might waive the protection under the applicable substantive 
law.”  Id.  at 29-30.  
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue 4 
 
26 
public comment referred to situations in which information had been 
produced “without intending to waive a claim of privilege.”116  That 
provision was removed “because many courts include intent in the 
factors that determine whether production waives privilege.”117  Thus, 
while the amended rules, if adopted, will embody a well-constructed 
procedure for resolving claims of inadvertent production, they do nothing 
to protect the privilege in jurisdictions where the substantive law would 
result in waiver. 
 
B. THE AMERICAN  BAR ASSOCIATION PUBLICATIONS 
 
[33]  The American Bar Association (ABA) also has recently published 
or revised a number of documents in part to address the problem of 
inadvertent disclosure, including the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (Model Rules), Civil Discovery Standards, and Formal Opinions 
of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. 
 
1. THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND FORMAL ETHICS 
OPINIONS 
 
[34]  Prior to 2003 the ABA, through its Formal Opinion 92-368, required 
that attorney recipients of inadvertently disclosed privileged or otherwise 
confidential information “refrain from examining the materials, notify the 
sending lawyer and abide the instructions of the lawyer who sent them.”118  
On October 1, 2005, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility retreated from that position because the former 
opinion conflicted with the amended Rule 4.4 of the Model Rules.119  The 
new ABA Formal Opinion 05-437 only requires the recipient to “promptly 
notify the sender in order to permit the sender to take protective 
measures.”120  Whether a waiver results from the inadvertent disclosure is 
“a matter of law beyond the scope” of the ABA ethics opinions.121 
                                                 
116 Judicial Conference Report, supra note 6, at Rules App. C-60.   
117 Id.  
118 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437 (2005) 
(“Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Materials: Withdrawal of Formal Opinion 92-
368” (November 10, 1992)). 
119 Id. at 1.  
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 2 (quoting Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.4.4, cmt. 2 (2002)). 




[35]  The action that spurred this retreat occurred in February 2002 when 
the ABA amended Model Rule 4.4 to add Rule 4.4(b) which states, “[a] 
lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the 
lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document 
was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”122  Comment 2 
to Rule 4.4 explains: 
 
Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive 
documents that were mistakenly sent or produced by 
opposing parties or their lawyers.  If a lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that such a document was sent 
inadvertently, then this Rule requires the lawyer to 
promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to 
take protective measures.  Whether the lawyer is required 
to take additional steps, such as returning the original 
document, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these 
Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of 
a document has been waived.123  
 
[36]  Thus, not only does the ABA acknowledge the inefficacy of the 
Model Rules in overcoming a finding of waiver under the substantive 
law, the ABA has actually retreated from imposing on attorneys ethical 
obligations that would, in some cases, exceed the responsibilities 
imposed by the substantive law.  The end result is that, even in 
jurisdictions where waiver is not automatic upon disclosure, the receiving 
attorney is no longer under an ethical duty to refrain from reading the 
privileged information pending a resolution of the waiver issue.  Thus, 







                                                 
122 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.4(b) (2002). 
123 Id. at 4.4(b)(2) (emphasis added).   
124 Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1990).   
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2. CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS 
 
[37]  In 1999 the ABA adopted its Civil Discovery Standards.125  The 
standards were revised in 2004 to incorporate “changes relating to 
electronic discovery.”126  Among other things, the ABA added standards 
for “Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information,”127 and “Attorney-
Client Privilege and Attorney Work Product,”128 in an attempt to provide 
guidance to litigants and courts on how best to handle the problem of 
inevitable inadvertent disclosure.  According to Standard 28, “parties 
should consider stipulating in advance that the inadvertent disclosure of 
privileged information ordinarily should not be deemed a waiver of that 
information or any information that may be derived from it.”129  In 
essence, the ABA has advocated that parties stipulate to a somewhat 
ambiguous form of the intent-required approach, in that inadvertent 
disclosure would not “ordinarily” result in waiver.  Unfortunately, the 
commentary does not provide any guidance as to what would be out of the 
ordinary.  More importantly, however, is the recognition in the 
commentary that the “law among various jurisdictions differs on the effect 
of an inadvertent production of privileged communications.”130 
 
[38]  This point is brought home even more clearly in Standard 32, which 
suggests that parties stipulate to the methods of extracting and reviewing 
electronic information to ostensibly avoid waiver of privileged 
information.131  Combining both “claw back” and “quick peek” options,132 
the standard also expressly recognizes that the parties to such a stipulation 
“should consider the potential impact that it may have on the producing 
                                                 
125 Civil Discovery Standards, 1999 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG., available at 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/discoverystandards/ (2004). 
126 Id. at 56. 
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 56. 
129 Id.. 
130 Id. 
131 Civil Discovery Standards, supra note 125, at 71. 
132 A “claw back” agreement would allow the producing party to demand the return of an 
inadvertently produced privileged document without waiver of the privilege.  Under a 
“quick peek” agreement, on the other hand, the receiving party would be allowed to 
inspect the documents of the producing party to identify those that it would like to have 
produced, which the producing party would then review for privilege.  See Daniel, supra 
note 18. 
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party’s ability to maintain privilege or work-product protection attaching 
to any such data if subsequently demanded by non-parties.”133  Indeed, the 
commentary goes on to admit that “there is no assurance that a stipulated 
order providing that inadvertent production does not effect a waiver will 
be effective against a claim of waiver by a third party.”134  In other words, 
absent a change to the substantive law, the ABA standards are, in many 
jurisdictions, aspirational only. 
 
V. A PLEA FOR GUIDANCE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
[39]  Inadvertent disclosure of privileged information is inevitable, 
particularly in light of the ever-increasing volumes of information that will 
be exchanging hands as discovery of electronically stored information 
becomes commonplace.  Yet, despite efforts by the Judicial Conference to 
provide a uniform and rational procedure for dealing with inadvertent 
disclosure, litigants are left to guess at the standard that will be applied in 
any particular case and often even in a single jurisdiction.  Worse, the 
ABA’s retreat from the ethical duty that would have at least required 
attorneys to refrain from reading and disseminating an inadvertently 
produced privileged communication until a court decides the waiver issue 
will ultimately undermine the producing party’s position in those 
jurisdictions in which the extent of the disclosure is a factor.  To restore 
the balance between facilitating full disclosure and protecting the 
communications between a client and her attorney, while recognizing the 
reality of modern discovery of electronically stored information and 
ensuring accountability and responsibility in the attorneys involved in the 
process, I recommend (1) a uniform standard to be applied by state and 
federal courts in the event of an inadvertent disclosure of privileged 
information, and (2) a modification to Model Rule 4.4(b) to ensure that 
court’s decisions are based on the conduct of the privilege owner rather 
than third parties. 
 
[40]  State and federal courts should adopt the multi-factor standard when 
evaluating whether an inadvertent disclosure results in a waiver of the 
privilege.  Although the multi-factor test has been criticized on the 
                                                 
133 Civil Discovery Standards, supra note 125, at 72.    
134 Id. at 74. 
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grounds that it is likely to lead to inconsistent results,135 it is the only test 
that can be rationally applied given the realities of modern discovery of 
electronically-stored information.  The strict liability test ignores the 
reality of the coming flood of data in modern discovery.  Even the most 
diligent attorneys will be unable to ensure with certainty that privileged 
information will not be disclosed to third parties.  To sanction the 
privilege-holder even after the most thorough and painstaking effort to 
preserve her privilege is to unduly minimize the importance of, and create 
a chilling effect on, confidential communications in the attorney-client 
relationship. While the per se approach has been lauded for creating a 
“strong incentive for careful document management during the course of 
discovery,”136 the draconian results that will ensue from the inevitable 
inadvertent disclosures associated with discovery of electronically-stored 
information, even with the most meticulous review processes, create a 
strong argument for the multi-factor analysis.137 
 
[41]  Likewise, the intent-required approach places absolutely no 
responsibility on the privilege-holder or her attorney to protect the 
confidentiality of their communications and thus tips the scale too far in 
the other direction.  Litigants and their attorneys should be held 
accountable for making reasonable efforts to protect the confidentiality of 
their communications.  To hold otherwise would unduly minimize the 
importance of full disclosure in our modern, discovery-driven system of 
litigation. 
 
[42]  Therefore, only the multi-factor analysis allows a court to consider 
the facts and circumstances of each case, including the privilege-holder’s 
diligence in protecting her own interests, before determining whether an 
inadvertent disclosure results in a waiver.138  However, the multi-factor 
                                                 
135 Bruckner-Harvey, supra note 30, at 390. 
136 Hardgrove, supra note 3, at 657-58. 
137 See also Hundley, supra note 2, at § 5 (noting that the “results [of the multi-factor 
analysis] tend to be more case- and fact-specific than the strict liability or a rigid 
adherence to the intent required approach; nonetheless, these courts’ method of analysis 
has emerged as a clearly defined matter of law”). 
138 At least one commentator has suggested that the “time factor,” which considers the 
diligence of the producing party in seeking to rectify its error, should be eliminated from 
the multi-factor test.  See Harding, supra, note 2, at 486-88.  Harding argues that (1) 
objections to the introduction of privileged evidence would occur at trial, and, as a result, 
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test alone will not resolve the present problem because attorneys are 
currently not ethically obligated to respect a potential privilege until its 
status is judicially determined.  Therefore, Model Rule 4.4(b) should be 
revised to impose on recipients of such information a duty not to interfere 
with or undermine the judicial determination. 
 
[43]  Specifically, Model Rule 4.4(b) should require that an attorney that 
receives potentially privileged information that she knows, or reasonably 
should know, was inadvertently disclosed, refrain from reviewing the 
information or disclosing it to anyone, including her client, pending a 
judicial determination of the status of the privilege.   This will ensure that 
the court reviewing the circumstances of the disclosure will base its 
decision on the actions of the producing party rather than on the actions of 
the receiving party, consistent with the long-standing principle that only 
the owner can waive the privilege. 
 
[44]  A uniform standard for determining the status of inadvertently 
disclosed privileged information in light of the conduct of the producing 
party, and an ethical rule placing more responsibility on the receiving 
attorney consistent with the importance of attorney-client 
communications, will best balance the interests of each as they face the 
coming onslaught of information in the electronic age of litigation. 
                                                                                                                         
there is no need to consider the issue before then; (2) the non-producing party will 
probably already have reviewed the document in question, which is the primary concern 
of the time element; and (3) “if the non-waiver presumption can be rebutted, it is because 
of an inadequacy in the manner in which the attorney produced the document(s) in the 
first place and not for how long the document(s) remained in the non-producing party’s 
possession.”  Id. at 488.  Each of these arguments fails scrutiny.  First, there is no reason 
to wait and resolve the status of a privilege until trial.  Indeed, any delay furthers the 
potential for unwarranted dissemination of the potentially privileged information, 
potentially undermining the privilege-holder’s interest in the confidential communication.  
Second, as noted infra, I believe that attorneys should be ethically bound to refrain from 
reviewing inadvertently disclosed information until the status of the privileged is 
judicially determined.  To cynically assume that the receiving party would read the 
privileged information places far too little trust in, and accountability on, the attorney in 
question.  Finally, the non-waiver presumption can, indeed, be rebutted by a lack of 
diligence in seeking to recover the disclosed information.  Delay indicates a lack of 
concern for the confidential information, or strategic decision-making, either of which 
undermines the party’s stated interest in maintaining the privilege. 
